While carelessness and downright malfeasance with respect to the security of classified materials has, unfortunately, been far too common in our recent history, what stands out for me is the degree to which such behavior has proceeded to higher levels of our government. Three such instances come immediately to mind.
In 2015, General David Petraeus, an accomplished and decorated military leader, former head of the CIA, and fellow Princeton alumnus, was charged with mishandling classified information. He subsequently pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge. The circumstances of General Petraeus’ violation of the law, while fodder for the tabloids, are not relevant here. What is relevant it the he knowingly provided classified information to a person who was not authorized to receive it. A man of his intellect, education and experience clearly should have known better. The fact that the information was to serve as additional fodder for his biography makes the situation worse.
During her tenure as Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton used a private server for both personal and official e-mail. This case, of course, has been widely publicized, particularly in the course of the recent presidential campaign. In the course of the investigation into this matter, Secretary Clinton indicated that she had not sent or received any material marked as classified on this server. When classified material was found on the server, the response was that she had not realized that the (C) at the beginning of a paragraph indicated that the contents were Confidential. She was not charged because the FBI felt that their was insufficient evidence that she “knowingly transmitted” classified material to unauthorized persons. Indeed, while transmission surely was possible given the unsecured nature of the server, no evidence seems to have appeared that it actually took place. What is most disturbing about this case is that a former First Lady, U.S. Senator and (at the time) current Secretary of State had so little understanding of appropriate procedures for handling classified materials. In the course of thirty years of active and reserve service in the U.S. Army, I cannot recall an instance of a cleared enlisted person or DOA civilian, let alone a commissioned officer, who displayed this level of knowledge deficiency.
Next I come to the current President of the United States. In the course of an interview with the Russian Foreign Minister and the Russian Ambassador to the United States he chose to reveal hitherto classified material to them. The material was classified TS/SI and code word protected. Now, as many have pointed out, this cannot be illegal since the President is the ultimate classification authority and could decide that the material was unclassified. However, at this level, such decisions are of great significance and should not be undertaken lightly on the spur of the moment. It is particularly frightening to note that, during the subsequent justification of the President’s decision, he and General McMaster, National Security Advisor, claimed that the President did not actually disclose sources and methods along with the intelligence itself. This represents a lack of understanding of what the SI designation and code word protection mean. What is meant is that, given knowledge of the classified intelligence, sources and methods could be inferred by unfriendly powers. You don’t have tell people that the information came from Agent 86 and was gathered in a communications intercept using his shoe phone.
I am moved to despair when I realize that officials at the highest levels of our government do not understand how to handle classified material or choose to ignore what they do understand. Some things really do need to be classified. Revealing sources and methods involved in the gathering of intelligence simply guarantees that these sources and methods cannot be used again. Counterintelligence officers are not stupid. If our officials lack information, they cannot make good decisions. I know. They sometimes make bad decisions even with good information, but one cannot have everything. Generals, Secretaries of State and Presidents simply must know better. Perhaps they should be required to listen to detailed security briefings before taking office and annually thereafter. Some of them would not listen because they already know everything because they are “smart” people. It is worth a try.
I couldn’t help but think of the religious equivalence of this — knowing how to look at the whole of the text and not simply proof-text to make religious texts say what you want them to say. Or the pastoral, which is Confidentiality matters. Thanks for sharing.