This is intended to update notifications to potential readers.
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Personal Views
This is intended to update notifications to potential readers.
Contact jhbaker36@gmail.com if there are any problems
When I began these posts during the first Trump administration, I had a great deal to say about the threats to national security posed by the policies, procedures and behaviors of that administration. I was naive enough to think that matters could not get worse. I am here to correct my error.
The problem of security clearances may come first. There is no doubt that the President of the United States has primary classification authority and, therefore, may decide who gets to be cleared to view classified material. We normally expect that the executive decision to grant a clearance is based upon the results of an examination of the subject’s background and behavior and that the decision will be delegated to appropriate agency heads. The published requirements are clear.
Confidential – National Agency Check, Local Agency Check, Credit Check – Good for 15 years.
Secret – Same as above – Good for 10 years.
Top Secret – Single Scope Background Investigation (formerly known as a Full Field Investigation). – Good for 5 years.
TS/Special Compartmented Intelligence – A very careful SSBI.
Special Code Name Projects – Very rare and same as TS/SCI.
A change in administrations involves investigative clearances for a large number of people. While the record checks for Confidential and Secret clearance can go quickly in this computer age, SSBIs are another matter. I am willing to guess that the investigation is either truncated or skipped altogether in granting clearances for some senior appointments. When one adds the very large number of Department of Government Efficiency jobs to the list of those needing clearances, I become suspicious. Were each of these clearances based upon an appropriate investigation?I tend to doubt it.
Clearances appear to be viewed as a sign of Presidential favor. If you are in favor, the President will grant you a clearance. If he doesn’t like you, he will take your clearance away. They are lollipops at the barber shop. I have carefully scanned the requirements for clearances, and I found no reference to liking the President among them.
We can now turn to the question of document security. Some media reports indicate that classified material previously removed from Mar-a-Lago under a court order has been returned to that estate. I have seen no notice of the construction of a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility at Mar-a-Lago. I assume that they have been returned to their former “secure” storage spots in closets, bathrooms and ballrooms. I wonder who signed for them as the Classified Documents Custodian. The President will no doubt claim that he has the absolute authority to keep classified material anywhere he pleases and that he can always de-classify them if someone chooses to be picky. I weep!
The latest discussion of military operations on an insecure public site using instruments that were probably not secure raises concerns to the highest. The response by participants and the Presidents which claims that no classified information was discussed has shocked intelligence and military professionals . Times, targets and weapons systems to be used are essential elements of operational security. We should be particularly disturbed that two of the participants in the group chats listed their experience as Major and Lieutenant Colonel in the USANG and the USAR as qualifications for their appointment. How does one get to be a field grade officer without understanding the relationship between operational security and classification?
It is also worthy of note that the law frequently cited in such matters (18 USC 793) refers to “defense information” not specifically “classified” information. Surely, information about the existence of an attack by U.S. forces, the targets of the attack, the forces involved and times is “defense information.” True military and intelligence experts understand this, but they were not involved. Apparently, the more you know about a subject the less you should be involved in decisions. Unfortunately, the law requires proof of intent, and a plea of ignorance would undoubtedly prove to be a sufficient defense.
As an unapologetic conservative on national security matters, I find little reason for hope. Although these event meet my definition of “high crimes or misdemeanors”,that view is unlikely to prevail. The verdict of history is likely to be “but, they didn’t intend to do any thing bad.”